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DANIEL C.K. CHOW* 
ABSTRACT 
In 2018, the Trump Administration claimed for the first time that 
the United States erred in supporting China’s accession to the World 
Trade Organization because China has failed to fulfill its 
commitments to dismantle its state-led economy and adopt open-
market oriented reforms.  Instead, China has maintained a 
mercantilist state-led economy in which China provides preferential 
treatment to its state-owned enterprises and supports their exports 
while it discriminates against U.S. companies in China and creates 
barriers to U.S. imports.  Frustrated with being unable to effect 
change through dialogue, the United States is now using punitive 
trade sanctions against China in disregard of the WTO.  China has 
retaliated in kind, igniting a potential global trade war. 
A review of the background of China’s accession to the WTO 
indicates, however, that China never made any commitments to 
dismantle the state sector of its economy and is not otherwise legally 
bound to do so under the WTO.  The claim that China agreed to 
adopt open markets is a myth created by President Bill Clinton due 
to wishful thinking or political expediency when he sought 
congressional support for China’s accession to the WTO in 2001.  
Clinton argued that China’s WTO entry would lead to the adoption 
of economic freedoms that in turn would lead to political freedoms 
and greater protection for human rights.  Clinton even dangled the 
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possibility China could shed the shackles of communism and 
embrace democracy.  In response to Clinton’s grandiose vision, 
China remained cautious and made no extravagant promises.  China 
promised only to adopt a hybrid system in which some free markets 
would operate within an overall state-led economy.  Rather than 
dismantling its state-led economy after its WTO accession, China 
has incessantly strengthened it.  Tightening the state’s grip over the 
economy serves important goals of the Communist Party, including 
further entrenching its power, whereas loosening its grip would be 
tantamount to relinquishing power, a prospect that the Party will 
never accept.  This Article argues that the United States must finally 
reject the Clinton myth and accept that China has no intention of 
dismantling its state-led economy.  Only with this sober realization 
can the United States deal effectively in the future with China in the 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Although the United States has long been critical of China’s 
compliance with its obligations under the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), the Trump Administration broke new ground 
in 2018 by stating that “the United States erred in supporting China’s 
entry into the WTO on terms that have proven ineffective in securing 
China’s embrace of an open, market-oriented trade regime.”1  The 
claim that the United States mistakenly supported China’s WTO 
membership goes beyond any criticism in previous U.S. 
administrations, which had always viewed China’s membership in 
the WTO, with all of its shortcomings, as an overall benefit to the 
multilateral trading system.2  The Trump Administration’s claim 
 
 1 OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2017 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON 
CHINA’S WTO COMPLIANCE 2 (Jan. 2018), 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/Reports/China%202017%20WT
O%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/5ND7-NS74] [hereinafter 2017 USTR REPORT]. 
 2 The pessimistic and critical tone of the 2017 USTR Report stands in stark 
contrast to annual USTR reports submitted during prior U.S. administrations on 
China’s WTO compliance.  These reports were markedly more optimistic and 
enthusiastic about China’s membership in the WTO.  For example, in its 2015 
Report, submitted during the Obama Administration, the USTR referred to the 
“tremendous potential presented by China’s WTO membership, including the 
breadth and depth of trade and investment—and prosperity—possible in a 
thriving, balanced global trading system.”  See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE 
REPRESENTATIVE, 2015 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON CHINA’S WTO COMPLIANCE 4 (Dec. 
2015), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2015-Report-to-Congress-China-
WTO-Compliance.pdf [https://perma.cc/7T57-KHTB].  In its 2010 Report, 
submitted during the Bush Administration, the USTR stated: “Despite the many 
challenges that remain, China’s WTO membership has continued to provide 
substantial ongoing benefits to the United States. Each year since China joined the 
WTO, . . . U.S.-China trade has expanded dramatically, providing numerous and 
substantial opportunities for U.S. businesses, workers, farmers and service 
suppliers and a wealth of affordable goods for U.S. consumers.”  See OFFICE OF THE 
U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2010 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON CHINA’S WTO 
COMPLIANCE 3 (Dec. 2010), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/
gsp/speeches/reports/2010/2010%20Report%20to%20Congress%20-
%20Dec%2023%20Final.pdf  [https://perma.cc/BX9C-NX7X].  In its first report on 
China’s compliance with the WTO submitted during the Clinton Administration, 
the USTR stated: “Overall, during the first year of its WTO membership, China 
made significant progress in implementing its WTO commitments, although much 
is left to do. . . . Despite the compliance problems that arose over the course of the 
past year, most private sector representatives remain enthusiastic about the actual 
and potential benefits for U.S. industry from China’s WTO membership.”  See 
OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2002 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON CHINA’S 
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indicates a new level of U.S. dissatisfaction with China’s WTO 
compliance and foreshadows new, more extreme measures in 
response.3 
The crux of the Trump Administration’s complaint is that China 
has broken its promises to implement economic reforms that would 
eventually dismantle China’s state-led, mercantilist economy, 
including the economy’s dominance by powerful state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs), business corporations that are administrative 
units of the state.4  Under the U.S. view, China made legal 
commitments as part of its entry into the WTO under its Protocol of 






 3 These measures include the use of unilateral trade sanctions against China, 
i.e. trade sanctions imposed without consulting with and in defiance of the WTO.  
See Daniel C.K. Chow, United States Unilateralism and the World Trade Organization, 
37 B.U. INT’L L. J. 1 (2019) [hereinafter Chow, United States Unilateralism)]. 
 4 DANIEL C.K. CHOW & THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
TRANSACTIONS: PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 458 (Wolters Kluwer, 3d ed. 2015) 
[hereinafter CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS]; see also 
2017 USTR REPORT, supra note 1, at 2. 
 5 World Trade Organization, Protocol on the Accession of the People’s 
Republic of China, WTO Doc., WT/L/432 (Nov. 23, 2001) 
https://docsonline.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/DirectDoc.aspx?filename=t%3A%2
Fwt%2Fl%2F432.doc& [https://perma.cc/GGD9-EPGX] [hereinafter China 
Protocol of Accession].  China’s Protocol of Accession was negotiated between 
China and other WTO members and sets forth the conditions of China’s entry into 
the WTO.   
 6 World Trade Organization, Report of the Working Party on the Accession of 
China, WTO Doc. WT/ACC/CHN/49 (Oct. 1, 2000), 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/wp_acc_china_e.doc 
[https://perma.cc/2XFE-R72H] [hereinafter China Working Party Report].  This 
document sets forth the negotiation history of China’s accession into the WTO with 
other WTO members, led by the United States.  In 1987, a working party was created 
to discuss the many conditions of China’s entry into the WTO.  The negotiation 
process took fourteen years, culminating in China’s accession in 2001. 
 7 Upon China’s accession to the WTO, China became bound to abide by all of 
the multilateral WTO agreements.  See China Protocol of Accession, supra note 5 at 
art. 1.  These are set forth in Annexes 1-2 of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing 
the World Trade Organization and include the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade 1994, the General Agreement on Trade in Services, the Agreement on Trade 
Related Intellectual Property Rights, and the Understanding on Rules and 
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes.  See Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/04-wto_e.htm 
[https://perma.cc/5E54-VMJ4] [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement].  In addition, 
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implement changes that would gradually replace its state-led 
economy with an economy based upon open market principles, 
consistent with the underlying foundations of the WTO.8  China’s 
failure to fulfill its WTO commitments has allowed China to reap the 
benefits of WTO membership and become a dominant trading 
nation while not allowing the United States to enjoy reciprocal 
benefits in obtaining access to China’s markets.9  Moreover, China is 
actively harming U.S. interests with a host of mercantilist policies 
that discriminate against U.S. companies in China.10  Some of these 
specific arguments against China are not new to the Trump 
Administration but were also asserted by past U.S. administrations.  
For nearly two decades, since the administration of President Bill 
Clinton, the United States has asserted that China promised to 
dismantle the state sector and adopt an open market-oriented 
economy as part of its entry into the WTO.11 
Despite these claims by the United States, however, an 
examination by this Article of the history of China’s accession 
process and the relevant WTO documents indicates that China never 
pledged to dismantle its state-led economy and, as the United States 
asserts, to “move towards a true market economy.”12  The claim that 
China promised to implement free market reforms is a myth created 
by the United States as a result of wishful thinking, political 
expedience, and willful ignorance of China’s major industrial 
policies and national initiatives developed and announced with 
great fanfare by China since the early 2000s shortly after China’s 
entry into the WTO.13  These policies and initiatives boldly support 
the exact opposite conclusion: China is committed to strengthening 
the state sector, not dismantling it.14  This Article explains why China 
never made a commitment to dismantle the state sector, why China 
was under no WTO obligations when it acceded to the WTO in 2001, 
 
like all WTO members, China became bound by many specialized agreements 
associated with GATT that are set forth in Annex 1A. 
 8 See 2017 USTR REPORT, supra note 1, at 2. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Id. 
 11 See infra Section II.B. 
 12 See 2017 USTR REPORT, supra note 1, at 2 (noting that bilateral trade talks 
with China have repeatedly failed, not due to the fault of U.S. policymakers, “but 
because Chinese policymakers were not interested in moving toward a true market 
economy.”). 
 13 See infra Section II.B. 
 14 See infra Section III.A. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol41/iss4/2
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and why the United States created this myth.  China always 
intended to be a state-led economy as a member of the WTO.  Given 
these realities, this Article explains the consequences for U.S. trade 
policy towards China for the future, which must be guided by the 
following three major points. 
First, an examination of the documentary records surrounding 
the negotiations leading up to China’s accession to the WTO 
indicates that China never promised to implement open market-
oriented reforms that would dismantle the state sector.15  This claim 
was first asserted by President Bill Clinton to gain congressional 
approval for permanent Most Favored Nation (MFN) status for 
China in trade as part of China’s accession to the WTO.16  Although 
China did indicate during the WTO negotiations that it would 
implement economic reforms, these reforms were to occur within 
the overall framework of a state-led economy.17  In addition, an 
examination of China’s accession documents, including the Protocol 
of Accession, its Working Party Report, and the WTO agreements 
indicates that nothing in these WTO documents creates a legal 
obligation to adopt principles leading towards an open market 
economy.18  To be clear, China did make specific commitments 
under its Protocol of Accession, which set forth the conditions of its 
admission to the WTO, as well as under WTO agreements and China 
is arguably in breach of some of these specific obligations and the 
United States may be able to assert viable claims against China in 
the WTO dispute settlement system.19  But China’s having 
committed breaches of specific obligations is not the same as 
refusing to live up to its promises to dismantle the leading role of 
the state sector in China’s economy. 
Second, the Communist Party of China (the Party), in power as 
China’s rulers, has no intention of dismantling the state-led 
economy and replacing it with an open market economy.20  As 
explained below, the organization of China’s economy as a state-led, 
mercantilist economy allows the Party to control all vital sectors of 
 
 15 See infra Part II. 
 16 See infra Section II.B.  Most Favored Nation status was required for China 
to received favorable U.S. tariff rates.  The MFN principle is further discussed in 
note 83 infra. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. 
 20 See infra Part III. 
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the economy.21  For the Party, dismantling the state sector is 
equivalent to relinquishing power and opening itself up to 
challenges to its authority.22  The Party will not subject itself to this 
precarious fate.  As further explained below, the Party sees its role 
as the savior of China due to reasons of history and destiny.23  No 
ruler of China in its entire history has ever voluntarily surrendered 
power.24  Chinese history and tradition indicate that the Mandate of 
Heaven, by which the emperor exercises legitimate power and holds 
the throne, is never voluntarily relinquished—it is forfeited.25  In 
addition to the lessons of history, there are also some of the deepest 
tendencies of human nature at play: the Party’s control of the state-
led economy has allowed members of the Party, from its highest 
ranks on down to the lowest, to amass vast personal wealth.26  
Third, not only will China refuse to abandon the state-led 
economy, China will continuously strive to strengthen the role of the 
state for the foreseeable future.27  For the Party, strengthening the 
leading state sector further enhances its own power, further 
entrenches its role as China’s ruler, and further promotes the 
individual interests of Party members.28  Under the leadership of 
President Xi Jinping, the Party has shown the tendency to further 
augment its power, not to diminish it.29  The best example of this 
tendency is Xi himself who has now installed himself as a de facto 
ruler-for-life in China.30  The United States must realize and accept 
that this is China’s position.  For years, the United States has 
engaged in trade negotiations with China with the goal of having 
China dismantle the state-led sector.31  The United States frequently 
claims that while China is willing to implement small scale changes, 
 
 21 See infra Part III. 
 22 Id. 
 23 See DANIEL C.K. CHOW, THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF CHINA IN A NUTSHELL 120 (3d 
ed. 2015) [hereinafter CHOW, LEGAL SYSTEM OF CHINA]. 
 24 Id. at 121 (“In the more than 2,000 years of Chinese history dating back to 
the earliest Imperial Dynasty, the Eastern Zhou (771-256 BC), no ruling government 
of mainland China has ever voluntarily relinquished or transferred power to a 
succeeding government.  No succeeding government has ever assumed power 
without destroying the presiding government.”). 
 25 Id.  The emperor also forfeits his life, along with his Mandate. 
 26 See infra Section III.C. 
 27 See infra Part IV. 
 28 See id. 
 29 See infra Section III.C. 
 30 See id. 
 31 See 2017 USTR REPORT, supra note 1, at 2-3. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol41/iss4/2
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China is not willing to fundamentally change its system;32 China 
makes promises that it will make fundamental changes to the state-
led economy only to never follow through on those promises.33  The 
reality is that the Party has no intention of dismantling the state 
sector34, rather China will continuously develop a state-led 
economic system that is the opposite of the type of open market 
economy that the United States would like to see installed in China.35 
To be clear, despite any U.S. claims to the contrary, China is a 
sovereign nation that has every right and the full freedom to adopt 
any economic system that it wishes.36  There is no inherent reason 
why an open market economy is superior in a moral or legal sense 
to a state-led economy.37  Countries that choose to trade with China 
do so freely and with knowledge of the drawbacks of dealing with 
China.38  If China made promises in the WTO to dismantle the state 
sector that it did not keep or is bound by WTO obligations to do so 
that it has breached, that is a valid complaint but this Article argues 
that China neither made such promises nor is bound by any such 
obligations.  Moreover, it will become plain over the course of this 
Article that the Party has no intention of ever dismantling China’s 
state-led economy.  Given this position, if the United States believes 
that China’s economy is fundamentally at odds with the WTO then 
the United States and other WTO countries are confronted with a 
plain choice: they must either negotiate new conditions for China to 
remain in the WTO as a state-led economy or seek China’s exit from 
the WTO.39  The policy ramifications of this choice are further 
examined in the concluding portions of this Article below.40 
This Article will proceed in four parts as follows.  Part II will first 
discuss the U.S. complaints that China has not fulfilled its WTO 
commitments to dismantle the state sector and reform its economy 
in accordance with open market-oriented principles.  Part II will also 
discuss the background of China’s entry into the WTO.  In the 1990s, 
China viewed WTO membership as a priority.41  One major reason 
 
 32 See id. at 3. 
 33 See id. 
 34 See infra Section III.A. 
 35 See id. 
 36 See infra Part IV. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. 
 41 See infra Section II.B. 
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is that prior to China’s WTO membership, China had to endure the 
annual humiliation of a review by the U.S. Congress of its human 
rights record in order to obtain MFN tariff rates, much lower than 
non-MFN rates, from the United States.42  WTO membership would 
allow China to obtain MFN tariffs rates as a matter of right.43  Part II 
also discusses the legal documents supporting China’s WTO entry 
and shows that they did not create any commitments on China to 
dismantle its state-led economy.  Part III examines the critical role 
that the state-led economy and SOEs play in allowing the Party to 
control vital sectors of the economy.  Part IV explains why the 
United States must accept the reality that China will not abandon 
the state-led economy or subject it to fundamental reforms so long 
as the Party remains in power.  Part IV concludes with some 
observations for future U.S. trade policy concerning China. 
II. CHINA’S ACCESSION TO THE WTO AND THE MYTH OF OPEN 
MARKET REFORMS 
A. China’s State-Led Economy and the WTO 
The election of Donald J. Trump to the U.S. Presidency in 2016 
led to a torrent of new criticism of China’s trade practices, including, 
for the first time, a claim by a U.S. administration that it was a 
mistake to support China’s entry into the WTO.  Some of the 
sharpest criticism of China’s trade practices are contained in two 
recent reports by the United States Trade Representative (USTR), the 
top U.S. trade official,44 submitted to Congress in 2018.45  According 
 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. 
 44 See DANIEL C.K. CHOW & THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
LAW: PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 117 (3d ed. 2017) [hereinafter CHOW & 
SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW] (“Appointed by the President with 
cabinet rank, the USTR is the chief official of the Executive Branch with respect to 
international trade.”). 
 45 In addition to the 2017 USTR Report, supra note 1, on March 22, 2018, the 
USTR also submitted an executive office investigation brought under Section 301 of 
the Trade Act of 1974.  See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, FINDINGS OF 
THE INVESTIGATION INTO CHINA’S ACTS, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES RELATED TO 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND INNOVATION UNDER SECTION 
301 OF THE TRADE ACT OF 1974 (Mar. 22, 2018) https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/
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to the 2017 USTR Report, the underlying concern is that China 
continues to maintain a state-led economy.46  In the 2017 Report, the 
United States declared that “with the creation of the WTO, it was 
expected that each WTO member would pursue open, market-
oriented policies…”47  The United States expected that “the terms set 
forth in China’s Protocol of Accession would dismantle China’s 
existing state-led policies …”48  The United States further states: 
It is important to recall that WTO members are supposed to 
be moving toward market-based outcomes voluntarily.  The 
expectations of WTO membership were clearly set forth in 
the Marrakesh Declaration on April 15, 1994, at the 
conclusion of the Uruguay Round negotiations.  There, WTO 
members expressly affirmed their view that the 
establishment of the WTO ushers in a “new era of global 
economic cooperation” that “reflect[s] the widespread desire 
to operate in a fairer and more open multilateral trading 
system.”  WTO members further made clear their 
determination that their economies would participate in the 
international trading system based on both “open, market-
oriented policies and the commitments set out in the Uruguay 
Round Agreements and Decisions.49 
The crux of the U.S. grievances against China is that it has 
adopted a state-led mercantilist approach to international trade.50  
China uses myriad measures, practices, and policies to support its 
SOEs and other domestic Chinese companies in the internal China 
market while at the same time discriminating against multinational 
companies and other foreign companies.51  On international trade, 
 
Section%20301%20FINAL.PDF [https://perma.cc/QC6T-GYG9] [hereinafter 
USTR SPECIAL 301 REPORT].  On November 20, 2018, the USTR subsequently filed a 
report on China’s laws, policies, practices, or actions.  See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE 
REPRESENTATIVE, UPDATE CONCERNING CHINA’S ACTS, POLICIES AND PRACTICES 
RELATED TO TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INNOVATION (Nov. 
20, 2018), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/enforcement/301Investigations/
301%20Report%20Update.pdf [https://perma.cc/XJ2C-YLYD].  Both of these 
reports are highly critical of China’s practices related to theft of U.S. intellectual 
property rights. 
 46 2017 USTR REPORT, supra note 1, at 2. 
 47 Id. at 5. 
 48 Id. at 2. 
 49 Id. at 5 (emphasis added). 
 50 Id. at 3 (stating that “China continues to pursue myriad mercantilist 
policies…”). 
 51 Id. at 4. 
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China’s mercantilist policies strongly encourage and support 
exports while at the same time create significant barriers to 
imports.52  A major concern of the United States is China’s use of 
subsidies, i.e. financial contributions from the government,53 to 
support SOEs both within China and in export trade.  The use of 
subsidies to encourage exports by SOEs is viewed as particularly 
pernicious in international trade because these subsidies allow SOEs 
to sell their exports at lower prices in the United States thereby 
harming U.S. companies and U.S. consumers.54 
The United States singled out intellectual property rights (IPR) 
as a special area of concern that needed an independent 
investigation.  On August 14, 2017, President Trump authorized the 
USTR to conduct an investigation of China’s IPR practices under 
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.55  In its report of the results of 
its investigation, the USTR identified four areas of concern: (1) China 
forces U.S. companies to transfer their technology (i.e., IPR) to SOEs 
as a condition of setting up operations in China;56 (2) China imposes 
discriminatory requirements on U.S. companies that license their 
technologies to Chinese entities so that the U.S. licensors are unable 
to obtain market terms in their licensing agreements;57 (3) China is 
acquiring U.S. companies through mergers and acquisitions and 
thereby also acquiring their IPR assets;58 and (4) China is hacking 
into U.S. computer networks to acquire trade secrets from U.S. 
 
 52 WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF TRADE & MANUFACTURING POLICY, HOW CHINA’S 
ECONOMIC AGGRESSION THREATENS THE TECHNOLOGIES AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE WORLD 1 (Jun., 2018) 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/FINAL-China-
Technology-Report-6.18.18-PDF.pdf [https://perma.cc/9SLB-Y24B] (stating that 
China’s policies protect its home market from imports while expanding China’s 
exports and share of global markets). 
 53 See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 44, at 467. 
 54 U.S. consumers and companies are harmed because after the lower priced 
exports create a market niche by driving out domestic competitors, the exporter can 
raise the price of its goods or lower their quality. See id. at 469. 
 55 THE WHITE HOUSE, PRESIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES 
TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (Aug. 14, 2017) https://www.whitehouse.gov/
presidential-actions/presidential-memorandum-united-states-trade-
representative/ [https://perma.cc/Q2TT-65Y5].  The USTR conducts an annual 
review of intellectual property protection by its trading partners under Section 182 
of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended by the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness 
Act of 1988, the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, and the Trade Facilitation and 
Trade Enforcement Act of 2015, 19 U.S.C. § 2242 (2015). 
 56 USTR SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supra note 45, at 5. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol41/iss4/2
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companies and confidential information from the U.S. 
government.59  SOEs play significant roles behind the policies in all 
of these areas.60 
Given these are longstanding grievances that arise out of China’s 
accession to the WTO, a question may arise as to why the United 
States has not asserted these claims within the WTO dispute 
settlement system.  According to the United States, the WTO cannot 
address its grievances: 
While the WTO agreements do include a dispute settlement 
mechanism, this mechanism is not designed to address a 
situation in which a WTO member has opted for a state led 
trade regime that prevails over market forces and pursues 
policies guided by mercantilism rather than global economic 
cooperation.  The WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism is 
narrowly targeted at good faith disputes where one member 
believes that another member has adopted a measure or 
taken an action that violates a WTO obligation . . . . [I]t is not 
effective in addressing a trade regime that broadly conflicts 
with the fundamental underpinnings of the WTO system.  
No amount of enforcement activities by other WTO 
members would be sufficient to remedy this type of 
behavior.61 
 
 59 Id. 
 60 For example, in the case of technology transfers, the MNC may wish to set 
up a manufacturing facility in China.  The MNC may be required by law to set up 
the manufacturing facility as a joint venture with a local Chinese partner.  The local 
partner will be an SOE in the same industrial sector as the MNC.  PRC authorities 
may require as a condition of approving the joint venture that the MNC transfer 
valuable technology to the joint venture.  China’s reasoning is that without 
advanced technology the joint venture will not be able to manufacture the product.  
If the MNC transfers technology to the joint venture, the SOE, as the local partner, 
also acquires access to the MNC’s technology.  The SOE can then use the technology 
for its own purposes or provide access to the technology to the Chinese 
government.  MNCs claim that this is a form of “forced” technology because they 
are required to form a joint venture and provide its technology to the joint venture 
as a condition of entering the China market.  In the second case above of 
discriminatory licensing requirements, the MNC may be required to license its 
technology to an SOE as a condition of being able to use the technology in China.  
In the third case of purchasing equity interests in U.S. companies, a Chinese entity, 
usually an SOE, will purchase the assets of a U.S. company and acquire all property 
interests of the U.S. company including its intellectual property portfolio.  In all of 
these cases, SOEs can play a crucial role. 
 61 2017 USTR REPORT, supra note 1, at 5. 
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Adding further to U.S. frustrations, not only has China failed to 
make any meaningful changes to its state-led economy to move 
towards an open market in the intervening years since WTO 
accession, instead, China has moved in the opposite direction by 
further strengthening the grip of the state and increasing the role of 
the state in its economy.62  All of this has occurred despite years of 
negotiations with the United States.63  Exasperated, the United States 
declared that since the “carrot” of negotiations with China has not 
worked, it is now time for the United States to brandish the “stick” 
of enforcement: 
For more than 15 years, the United States has relied on 
cooperative high-level dialogues to effect meaningful and 
fundamental changes in China’s state-led, mercantilist trade 
regime.  These efforts have largely failed.  Accordingly, the 
United States intends to focus its efforts on enforcement 
going forward . . . . The United States is determined to use 
every tool available to address harmful Chinese policies and 
practices . . . Americans have waited long enough.  The time 
has come for China to stop its market-distorting policies and 
practices and finally become a responsible member of the 
WTO.64 
Apparently, the Trump Administration believes that since the 
United States cannot persuade China through high-level dialogues 
to adopt market reforms and the WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism cannot discipline China, the United States will use 
threats, intimidation, and punitive measures in order to coerce 
China to adopt market reforms.  The United States’ enforcement 
arsenal “will include not only the use of the WTO’s dispute 
settlement mechanism to hold China strictly accountable for 
adherence to its WTO obligations, but also other needed 
mechanisms, available under U.S. trade laws.”65  True to its word, in 
2018, the United States plunged the global economy into a state of 
nervous uncertainty by imposing unilateral, punitive tariffs of $250 
billion on Chinese goods66 under U.S. trade laws without consulting 
 
 62 Id. at 2. 
 63 Id. at 25. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Yoni Blumberg, Trump’s $250 billion in China tariffs are now in effect—here’s 
what could get more expensive, CNBC (Sep. 25, 2018), 
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with and in defiance of the rules of the WTO.67  China immediately 
replied with retaliatory tariffs of $110 billion on U.S. goods68 setting 
the stage for a drawn out and destructive trade war, the full 
repercussions of which are yet to be determined. 
B. China’s Accession to the WTO and Its Obligation to Implement 
Market Reforms 
1. China, the GATT, and Most Favored Nation Tariffs 
As the crux of the U.S. grievance against China is its failure to 
fulfill its commitments to dismantle the state sector of its economy, 
we need to examine whether China made an explicit or implicit 
promise to adopt these commitments.  We can start this analysis by 
examining the background and circumstances surrounding China’s 
entry into the WTO.  Although China was an original contracting 
party in 1947 to a predecessor organization of the WTO, the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), China withdrew from the 
GATT in 1950.69  In the late 1940s, China was in the midst of internal 
chaos and upheaval caused by a destructive civil war that erupted 
soon after the end of the Second World War.70  With the strong 
financial and military support of the United States, the Nationalist 
government, led by Chiang Kai-Shek, had a tenuous grip on power 
but soon became embroiled in a mortal conflict with the insurgent 




 67 Chow, United States Unilateralism, supra note 3. 
 68 Milton Ezrati, Trade War From the Chinese Side, FORBES (Oct. 3, 2018), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/miltonezrati/2018/10/03/trade-war-from-the-
chinese-side/#141121296e10 [https://perma.cc/B735-BQPT]. 
 69 Daniel C.K. Chow, Why China Opposes Human Rights in the World Trade 
Organization, 35 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 61, 71 (2013) [hereinafter Chow, Human Rights in 
the WTO]. 
 70 Id. at 72. 
 71 See CHOW, LEGAL SYSTEM OF CHINA, supra note 23, at 13. 
 72 Chiang had an army that was twice the size of the Communists at the 
beginning of the conflict and also the advantage of American equipment and 
backing.  See Id.  While Chiang had material advantages, he was unable to overcome 
problems of incompetence in the field and corruption in command.  Id. 
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vanquished the Nationalist government to Taiwan.73  Mao then 
focused the new nation’s energies on self-sufficiency, introspection, 
and revolutionary ideals;74 Mao had no interest in international 
engagement through trade but was focused on nation-building and 
national purification instead.75  After several decades marked by 
periods of calm interrupted by intermittent spasms of destructive 
political purges and chaos, China finally turned outward and 
focused on economic development in order to alleviate the abject 
poverty that the nation still suffered from its founding in 1949 
through the decade of the 1970s and for most of its history.76  As 
China turned to trade, China found that it needed to join the 
GATT/WTO in order to receive favorable tariffs from GATT/WTO 
member nations and protections against discriminatory treatment.77  
While China began negotiations for accession to the WTO in 1984, 
China’s accession would not be completed until 2001.78  In the 
meanwhile, China faced a serious hurdle in the form of high tariffs 
on its goods from the United States, one of China’s most important 
export markets.79 
Imports from China enter the United States subject to the 
imposition by U.S. Customs of tariffs under the Harmonized Tariff 
Schedule of the United States (HTSUS), a practice that still holds 
today.80  The HTSUS contains two general categories of tariffs 
applicable to imports that are set forth in two columns.81  In Column 
1 are the Most Favored Nation (MFN) tariffs, i.e. favorable tariff 
rates that the United States applies to goods from other WTO 
 
 73 Id. 
 74 Chow, Human Rights in the WTO, supra note 69, at 72. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. at 73. 
 77 GATT/WTO members are entitled to the benefit of bound tariffs, i.e. tariffs 
subject to ceilings under the GATT/WTO and to MFN treatment, i.e. the lowest 
tariffs that a WTO member gives to any other nation.  See General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), art. II:1(a)-(b) (tariff bindings) and art. I (MFN principle), 
Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194. 
 78 See Press Release, World Trade Organization, WTO Successfully Concludes 
Negotiations on China’s Entry (Sept. 17, 2001), 
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres01_e/pr243_e.htm 
[https://perma.cc/AG25-UJVL] (stating background information on China’s entry 
into the GATT /WTO). 
 79 Chow, Human Rights in the WTO, supra note 69, at 75. 
 80 CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, supra note 
4, at 137-38. 
 81 Id. at 138. 
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members.82  All WTO members have the right to receive these tariffs 
under the MFN principle contained in GATT Article I.83  As most 
nations enjoy MFN tariffs under the HTSUS, the United States now 
eschews the use of the term “MFN” since it implies favoritism and 
instead uses the term “Normal Trade Relations” (NTR) to designate 
those nations that receive the Column 1 tariff rates.84  Under Column 
2 of the HTSUS are the old Smoot-Hawley85 tariff rates implemented 
during the high tide of protectionism in the 1930s.86  Column 2 rates 
are draconian, averaging 53 percent of the value of the import, and 
were intended to prevent trade.87  Only a few pariah nations, such 
as North Korea, Cuba, and Iran, receive these rates under the 
HTSUS.88  In the 1990s, leading up to China’s WTO accession, China 
 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. Article I of the GATT requires the United States to grant all WTO 
members the most favorable tariff rates that it grants to any other nation, 
irrespective of whether the nation is a WTO member.  This means that if the United 
States grants a low tariff rate to Country X then under the MFN principle the United 
States must automatically and unconditionally grant the same low tariff rate to 
every other WTO member.  Countries are entitled to MFN treatment only if they 
are members of the WTO or otherwise have a treaty with the United States 
requiring MFN treatment.  The availability of MFN treatment serves as an 
inducement for countries to join the GATT/WTO.  See GATT, supra note 77, art. I.  
See also CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 44, at 150. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. ch. 4 (1930). 
 86 CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, supra note 
4, at 138-40. 
 87 CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 44, at 18. 
 88 CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, supra note 
4, at 138-40 (discussing North Korea and Cuba as rogue states).  North Korea, Iran, 
and Cuba are subject to numerous additional U.S. sanction regimes that impose 
independent restrictions limiting or preventing trade aside from Column 2 tariffs.  
In the case of North Korea, these sanction regimes include the National 
Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1655 (1976); International Emergency Economic 
Powers Act, Pub. L. No. 95-223, 91 Stat. 1625 (2007); North Korean Sanctions and 
Policy enhancement Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-122, 130 Stat. 93 (2016); and Section 
5 of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945, ch. 583, 59 Stat. 620 (1945).  In the 
case of Cuba, these other regimes include the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export 
Enhancement Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 7201-7211 (2000); Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, 22 
U.S.C. ch. 69 §§ 6001-6010 (1992); Trading with the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. ch. 53 §§ 
4301-4341 (1917); and Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 
1966, Pub. L. No. 104-114, 110 Stat. (1966).  In the case of Iran, these regimes include 
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 
104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996); Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and 
Divestment Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-195, 124 Stat. 1312 (2010); Iran Freedom 
and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-239, 126 Stat. 2004 (2013); 
and Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, Pub. L. No. 115-44, 
131 Stat. 886 (2017).  
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was also subject to the Column 2 Smoot-Hawley rates since it was 
not a WTO member and did not have a bilateral trade treaty with 
the United States granting MFN treatment.89 
In order to obtain MFN or NTR tariffs from the United States, 
China needed to obtain congressional approval on an annual basis 
subject to a review of China’s human rights record.90  In 1971, the 
United States had passed the Jackson-Vanik amendment as part of 
the Trade Act of 1974 to pressure the Soviet Union to allow the 
emigration of Soviet Jews to the United States or Israel.91  The United 
States could approve MFN treatment for the Soviet Union based 
upon an annual certification of compliance or a presidential waiver 
excusing the application of the statute due to progress in the area of 
human rights.92  As the Jackson-Vanik amendment was drafted in 
general terms, the United States began to apply the amendment to 
China on an annual basis in determining whether to grant MFN 
treatment for Chinese goods.93  Congress had to “approve” China’s 
human rights record each year as a condition of granting MFN 
tariffs.94 
China’s annual approval process for MFN treatment soon 
became a lurid spectacle of “China bashing” in which Congress 
scolded China for its poor human rights record and lectured China 
on how to cure its many deficiencies, only to approve MFN status 
 
 89 See Chow, Human Rights in the WTO, supra note 69, at 77-78 (explaining that 
because of its status as a non-GATT party state, China would receive the higher 
Column 2 Smoot-Hawley tariff rates unless it received an annual certificate of 
compliance with the Jackson-Vanik amendment to the Trade Act of 1974 or a 
presidential waiver therefor). 
 90 See id. at 77 (“[T]he United States agreed to extend the GATT rates to China 
based upon an annual approval of MFN status by the U.S. President.  This approval 
was conditioned on an annual review of China’s human rights record.” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
 91 The Jackson-Vanik amendment was enacted into law as part of Title IV of 
the 1974 Trade Act, Pub. L. No. 93-617, 88 Stat. 1978, signed into law on Jan. 3, 1975 
by President Gerald Ford.  The amendment was designed to pressure the Soviet 
Union to allow ease of emigration for Jews.  See Thomas J. Probert, The Innovation of 
the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: A HISTORY 323 
(Brendan Simms & D.J.B. Trim eds., 2011) (describing the history of the 
amendment’s passage). 
 92 Chow, Human Rights in the WTO, supra note 69, at 77. 
 93 See id. at 77-78 (describing how because the amendment uses general 
language, its application is not limited to any particular country). 
 94 Id. at 79 (describing the process by which Congress and the president would 
conduct annual approval and grant China its waiver). 
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for China year after year.95  For its part, China, in the role of the 
contrite supplicant, endured this humiliating process in stoic silence 
and, in response to U.S. demands, made a few symbolic human 
rights gestures in order to obtain MFN status.96  To avoid having to 
suffer through this painful and degrading annual ritual, China 
sought to become a member of the WTO, which would grant MFN 
status as a matter of right.97  In addition, China’s accession to the 
WTO would add much-needed predictability and certainty for its 
export trade by grounding MFN on a permanent legal basis and not 
on the whims of grandstanding U.S. politicians.98  Once China 
became a WTO member, then China would be entitled to MFN 
tariffs from the United States as a matter of right under the WTO, 
and the Jackson-Vanik amendment would become irrelevant. 
2. Clinton’s Vision of China and the WTO 
China found a strong supporter of its cause in President Bill 
Clinton, who viewed China’s WTO membership as an agent of 
potentially profound and positive change in China.99  In urging 
congressional approval for the granting of permanent MFN status 
to China as a result of its accession to the WTO, President Clinton 
argued that WTO membership would encourage positive political 
 
 95 See James A. Dorn, Time to Repeal the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, CATO INST. 
(Jul. 14, 1999), https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/time-repeal-
jacksonvanik-amendment [https://perma.cc/5PZL-SMLT] (arguing that the 
annual recertification process has been used too often to bash China). 
 96 See The Associated Press, China Releases 3 Prisoners in Gesture to U.S., N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 5, 1994), https://www.nytimes.com/1994/02/05/world/china-
releases-3-prisoners-in-gesture-to-us.html [https://perma.cc/68RE-USWD] 
(relaying how China released three political prisoners in a political gesture to obtain 
MFN treatment from the United States). 
 97 Every member of the GATT/WTO has a right to MFN treatment under 
GATT, Article I.  GATT, supra note 77, art. I.   
 98 Id. 
 99 Eric Schmitt & Joseph Kahn, The China Trade Vote: A Clinton Triumph; House, 
in 237-197 Vote, Approves Normal Trade Rights for China, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2000), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2000/05/25/world/china-trade-vote-clinton-
triumph-house-237-197-vote-approves-normal-trade-rights.html 
[https://perma.cc/ZY5C-RVMS] [hereinafter Schmitt & Kahn] (explaining how 
President Clinton “threw the powers of the presidency” behind the bill to approve 
normal trade rights for China). 
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reforms in China, including greater protections for human rights.100  
Although negotiations for China’s WTO accession had started 
during the Presidency of Ronald Regan, China’s entry into the WTO 
would be a major achievement, and Clinton was eager to have this 
event occur before the end of his presidency.101  Addressing these 
concerns in a major speech on March 9, 2000 at Johns Hopkins 
University, Clinton made an explicit link between China’s accession 
to the WTO and a commitment to adopt open market-oriented 
policies: 
By joining the W.T.O., China is not simply agreeing to import 
more of our products; it is agreeing to import one of 
democracy’s most cherished values: economic freedom.  The 
more China liberalizes its economy, the more fully it will 
liberate the potential of its people . . . . And when individuals 
have the power[] not just to dream but to realize their 
dreams, they will demand a greater say.102  
Clinton then made a critical link between economic freedom and 
political freedom: 
There’s something even more revolutionary at work here.  
By lowering the barriers that protect state-owned industries, 
China is speeding a process that is removing government 
from vast areas of people’s lives . . . . [China] will have fewer 
instruments . . . with which to control people’s lives.  And 
that may lead to very profound change . . . .  [China] will find 
that the genie of freedom will not go back into the bottle.  As 
Justice Earl Warren once said, liberty is the most contagious 
force in the world . . . . I understand that this is not in and of 
itself a human-rights policy.  But still, it is likely to have a 
profound impact on human rights and political liberty.103 
Clinton’s reasoning is that by joining the WTO, China agreed to 
adopt “economic freedom” in the form of free markets; as a result, 
China would dismantle the state sector, and that would lead to 
political reform that would protect human rights.  According to 
 
 100 Id. (describing President Clinton’s argument that rejecting permanent 
MFN status “would undercut China’s reformers”). 
 101 Id. 
 102 President Bill Clinton, Speech on China Trade Bill (Mar. 9, 2000), 
https://www.iatp.org/sites/default/files/Full_Text_of_Clintons_Speech_on_Chi
na_Trade_Bi.htm [https://perma.cc/K2HL-HH94] [hereinafter Clinton]. 
 103 Id. 
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Clinton, China could undergo nothing less than an economic and 
political revolution with its WTO accession and might even shed the 
shackles of communism in favor of democracy.104  Clinton dangled 
the prospect of democratic reform in China as the ultimate prize of 
China’s entry into the WTO and congressional approval of 
permanent MFN or NTR status for China.  The liberation of China 
from Communism would rectify one of the United States’ most 
bitter disappointments of the Second World War when Mao Zedong 
and his guerilla communist forces overthrew the U.S.-backed 
government of Chiang Kai-Shek.105  This catastrophe was portrayed 
by Congress and the press at the time as the “loss of China” to 
communism and is referenced by Clinton at the beginning of his 
speech.106  For Clinton, the personal and professional stakes were 
high because China’s potential embrace of democracy would be a 
crowning achievement for his presidency.107 
In retrospect, these arguments seem to be illusory and quixotic, 
but at the time, a highly skilled politician marshaled them effectively 
before Congress and the American public.  Whether these 
arguments are the result of wishful thinking or the expedient tactics 
of a crafty politician remains unclear.  But this line of argument was 
repeatedly made by the Clinton Administration to gain political 
support for the congressional grant of permanent MFN or NTR 
status to China and appeared to gain currency within U.S. political 
discourse.108  This line of argument by Clinton appears to be the 
 
 104 See, e.g., Press Release, White House, The U.S.-China WTO Agreement Will 
Help Promote Reform, Accountability, and Openness in China (Mar. 8, 2000), 
https://clintonwhitehouse4.archives.gov/WH/New/html/20000308_2.html. 
[perma.cc/VN7C-LBJV] (providing several optimistic statements of potential 
political change in China from persons described as “Democracy and Human 
Rights Activists”). 
 105 See CHOW, LEGAL SYSTEM OF CHINA, supra note 23, at 13 (describing the loss 
America felt when China fell to communism after hoping that it would become a 
democracy in Asia to counterbalance the Soviet Union). 
 106 Id. (“The loss of China to communism triggered a wave of bitter 
recriminations in the United States.”); Clinton, supra note 102 (“At the dawn of the 
Cold War, when I was a young boy beginning to study such things, it was a cudgel 
in a political battle: ‘Who lost China?’”). 
 107 Schmitt & Kahn, supra note 99 (stating that President Clinton considered 
the passage of the bill to be “a crowning foreign policy triumph” of his presidency). 
 108 One indication of the extent to which Clinton’s line of reasoning has gained 
acceptance in U.S. political discourse is that in 2017, Congress was still insisting that 
China’s entry into the WTO came with commitments by China of political reforms 
and the development of the rule of law.  See Hearing on The Broken Promises of China’s 
WTO Accession: Reprioritizing Human Rights Before the Congressional-Executive 
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genesis of the myth that China agreed to implement market reforms 
upon entry into the WTO. 
3. China’s Views of Needed Reforms for the WTO 
In response to Clinton’s grandiose vision of its future, a cautious 
China said nothing and made no bold promises.  A perusal of 
China’s WTO accession documents does not disclose any promises 
to dismantle the state sector and adopt open markets.  In its Protocol 
of Accession, the formal document approved by the WTO that sets 
forth the specific terms and conditions of China’s accession, there is 
not one mention of a commitment by China to adopt open market 
reforms.  The Protocol of Accession contains specific WTO 
obligations, including the publication of laws, regulations, and other 
measures affecting trade in goods, services, or intellectual property 
rights;109 the elimination of all taxes and charges applied to 
exports;110 and implementation of specific commitments in a 
schedule on agricultural products.111  These are specific, concrete, 
and technical commitments that are legally binding, but China made 
no promises to introduce sweeping macro-economic policies or to 
dismantle the state sector. 
China’s expectations on its needed reforms as part of joining the 
WTO are discussed in the Working Party Report, which is a record 
of the negotiations between China, the United States, and other 
WTO members on China’s accession.112  The Working Party Report 
is not legally binding except for Paragraph 342 (itself referring to 
numerous specific commitments), which was expressly 
incorporated in the Protocol of Accession.113  Otherwise, the 
Working Party Report is useful as a historical record in providing 
context and background for China’s expectations in joining the 
WTO, explained as follows: 
 
Commission on China, 115th Cong. 42 (2017) (statement of Michael R. Wessel, 
Commissioner, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission) (stating 
that China had made commitments “in conjunction with the 1997 handover”). 
 109 China Protocol of Accession, supra note 5, art. 2(C)(1). 
 110 Id. art. 11(3). 
 111 Id. art. 12(1). 
 112 China Working Party Report, supra note 6. 
 113 China Protocol of Accession, supra note 5, art. 1(2) (incorporating 
Paragraph 342). 
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In statements to the GATT 1947 Working Party and 
subsequently to the Working Party on the Accession of 
China, the representative of China stated that China’s 
consistent efforts to resume its status as a contracting party 
to GATT and accession to the WTO Agreement were in line 
with its objective of economic reform to establish a socialist 
market economy as well as its basic national policy of 
opening to the outside world.  China’s WTO accession 
would increase its economic growth and enhance its 
economic and trade relations with WTO Members.114 
The Working Party Report indicates that China had an 
“objective of economic reform to establish a social market economy” 
as part of an overall objective of trading with the rest of the world.115  
The concept of a socialist market economy, however, is not new to 
China’s WTO accession.  According to China’s Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, China has been developing a socialist market economy since 
the beginning of economic reforms in 1978.116  Today, the concept of 
a socialist market economy is fundamental to China.  As embodied 
in Article 6 of the PRC Constitution: 
The basis of the socialist economic system of the People’s 
Republic of China is socialist public ownership of the means 
of production, namely, ownership by the whole people and 
collective ownership by the working people . . . . In the 
primary stage of socialism, the State upholds the basic 
economic system in which the public ownership is dominant 
and diverse forms of ownership develop side by side.117 
The PRC Constitution makes it clear that in a socialist market 
economy, the state-led sector plays a dominant role.  Article 7 of the 
PRC Constitution states: “The State-owned economy, namely, the 
socialist economy under ownership by the whole people, is the 
 
 114 China Working Party Report, supra note 6, at para. 4. 
 115 Id. 
 116 See The Socialist Market Economy: Introduction, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ljzg_665465/zgjk_665467/3582_665489/t17
865.shtml [https://perma.cc/8KJB-D6F4] (describing how “commodity, capital, 
labor service and technology markets have appeared one after the other in China” 
since 1978, transforming the planned economy system into a socialist market 
economy, and asserting that this transformation has strengthened the market’s 
regulatory function “tremendously”). 
 117 XIANFA art. 6 (2004) (China). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,
962 U. Pa. J. Int'l L.   [Vol. 41:4 
leading force in the national economy.  The State ensures the 
consolidation and growth of the State-owned economy.”118 
These official sources indicate that by “socialist market 
economy,” China means that it will have a hybrid economy: state-
led, with free-market features, and SOEs playing a decisive role.  
This concept is embedded in the PRC Constitution and has been 
recognized as guiding the country since 1978.  These sources 
indicate that China’s own views of its obligations to reform its 
economy as part of its accession to the WTO are far removed from 
the U.S.-described efforts of China’s obligation to adopt a market 
economy.  The grandiose vision of a China in which economic 
reform would lead inevitably to political reform and the growth of 
democracy was invented by Clinton and then accepted by 
subsequent U.S. administrations, including the current 
administration of President Trump. 
C. The WTO and Open Market-Oriented Policies 
Even if China never promised to adopt open-market reforms, 
China would be under a legal obligation to do so if any of the 
relevant WTO legal documents created such an obligation.  To 
understand China’s commitments, we now examine the immediate 
legal consequences of China’s entry into the WTO.  Under Article 
XII(1) of the Marrakesh Agreement on Establishing the WTO,119 China 
acceded to the WTO pursuant to its Protocol of Accession, which 
committed China to abide by the multilateral agreements of the 
WTO, i.e., the GATT (1994)120 covering trade in goods, the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)121 covering trade in 
services, and the Agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Property 
 
 118 Id. art. 7. 
 119 Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 7; see also Protocols of accession for new 
members since 1995, including commitments in goods and services, WTO (last visited 
(Apr. 11, 2020), https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/
acc_e/completeacc_e.htm [https://perma.cc/LJ8Y-7BPB] (containing an official 
record of China’s accession to the Marrakesh Agreement). 
 120  GATT, supra note 77; see also China Protocol of Accession, supra note 5.  
 121 General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
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(TRIPS)122 covering trade in technology.  A perusal of all of these 
agreements and their corollary agreements,123 including a 
description of general goals and policies contained in their 
preambles, shows no mention of a requirement to adopt open 
market-oriented reforms.  Rather, these agreements contain specific 
obligations, many of them technical in nature. 
The only WTO document supporting the U.S. position is the 
Marrakesh Declaration of 15 April 1994 marking the conclusion of 
the Uruguay Round of negotiations that established the WTO.  In its 
preamble, the Marrakesh Declaration states that nations had 
participated in the Uruguay Round of negotiations “based upon 
open, market-oriented policies.”124  In its 2017 Report on China WTO 
Compliance to Congress, the USTR specifically quotes this language 
in the Marrakesh Declaration as the source of China’s obligation to 
adopt open market-oriented reforms.125 
The Marrakesh Declaration was issued by the highest decision-
making body of the WTO, the Ministerial Conference, consisting of 
trade ministers from all members.126  The Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the WTO refers in numerous instances to the 
Ministerial Council127 and its decision-making powers, but while the 
Agreement describes the legally binding nature of decisions issued 
by the Ministerial Conference, it never mentions declarations.  The 
Marrakesh Agreement makes it clear that the Ministerial Conference 
has the power to make “decisions” on all matters involving the WTO 
agreements “in accordance with the specific requirements for 
decision-making in this Agreement and in the relevant Multilateral 
Trade Agreement.”128  The Marrakesh Agreement sets forth the 
 
 122  Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 
1869 U.N.T.S. 299, https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4SQP-ZK5C]. 
 123 The GATT has twelve corollary agreements, including agreements dealing 
with agriculture, anti-dumping duties and subsidies, technical barriers to trade, and 
sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures; these are set forth in Annex 1A of the 
Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 7. 
 124 Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 7.  
 125 2017 USTR REPORT, supra note 1, at 5. 
 126 The Ministerial Conference meets every two years.  See CHOW & 
SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 44, at 28. 
 127 The Ministerial Council is also known as the General Council.  It is the 
standing body of all of the trade ministers of WTO members who have permanent 
offices at the WTO headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland.  Id. 
 128 Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 7, art. IV:1. 
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voting requirements for a decision but not for a declaration.129  A 
Ministerial decision can affect rights under the WTO multilateral 
agreements by interpreting those agreements.130  Article XVI of the 
Marrakesh Agreement states: “Except as otherwise provided under 
this Agreement or the Multilateral Trade Agreements, the WTO 
shall be guided by the decisions, procedures and customary 
practices followed by the CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT 1947 
and the bodies established in the framework of GATT 1947.”131 
By contrast, a Ministerial declaration has no legal authority.  This 
was made clear by the WTO panel in U.S.—Lead and Bismuth II, 
which explained: 
A Ministerial Declaration is a mere “Declaration,” rather 
than a “Decision” of the Ministers; a Declaration lacks the 
mandatory authority of a Decision; in the Ministerial 
Declaration, Ministers simply “recognize . . . the need” for 
the consistent resolution of disputes; the simple recognition 
of the need for an action does not mandate the action; in a 
Ministerial Decision, by contrast, Ministers “decide” that 
certain action shall be taken.132 
The one textual support in the WTO for the U.S. position that 
China has an obligation to adopt “open, market-oriented policies” is 
a non-binding statement in a ceremonial declaration issued to mark 
the end of the Uruguay Round of negotiations;  the statement may 
be aspirational in nature, but it is not mandatory according to WTO 
jurisprudence.  This is hardly adequate legal support for the U.S. 
claim that China has failed to fulfill its commitments to replace its 
state-led sector with an open-market economy. 
 
 129 Id. art. IX:1 (“Decisions of the Ministerial Conference…shall be taken by a 
majority of the votes cast, unless otherwise provided in this Agreement or in the 
relevant Multilateral Trade Agreement”). 
 130 Id. art. IV:1. 
 131 Id. art. XVI. 
 132  Panel Report, United States—Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom, 
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III. THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND THE STATE-LED ECONOMY 
A. China’s SOEs in the New Millennium 
The United States claims that it has, for the past fifteen years, 
engaged in good-faith negotiations with China, encouraging the 
state to follow through on its WTO obligations to dismantle its state-
led sector of the economy.133  An examination of the recent history 
of China’s industrial policies reveals that China has never indicated 
that it would abandon the state sector, but rather has consistently 
adopted policies to streamline and strengthen the state sector. 
After the watershed year of 1978, as China shifted its focus from 
revolutionary ideals to economic development and foreign trade,134 
China’s policy makers faced the daunting task of reforming its 
massive state sector led by SOEs.135  The Party had to address the 
problem of persistent financial losses that SOEs suffered year after 
year, which were a major drain on the economy.136  By 1997, China 
had adopted a policy of selling off less vital SOEs to the private 
sector and focusing on supporting a smaller set of SOEs in strategic 
industrial sectors.137  This policy was Zhua Da Fang Xiao—”manage 
the large and let go the small.”138  Although SOEs made up a smaller 
part of the economy as a result of these reforms, SOEs were 
maintained in all vital sectors of the economy, including banking, 
telecommunications, air and rail travel, steel and metals, oil and gas 
exploration and production, and electricity and water supply.139 
 
 133 2017 USTR REPORT, supra note 1, at 2. (“U.S. policymakers hoped that the 
terms set forth in China’s Protocol of Accession would dismantle existing state-led 
policies and practices that were incompatible with an international trading system 
expressly based on open, market-oriented policies and rooted in the principles of 
nondiscrimination, market access, reciprocity, fairness and transparency. But those 
hopes were disappointed.”). 
 134 See CHOW, LEGAL SYSTEM OF CHINA, supra note 23, at 26-27 (explaining how 
following Mao’s death in 1976, China “turned its attention to rebuilding [its] long[-
]neglected economy”). 
 135 See id. at 29 (explaining the policies that China enacted to grant SOEs 
independent legal status and wean them off state subsidies). 
 136 See id. at 26 (“[China’s] inefficient and poorly managed state sector resulted 
in the bulk of China’s economy operating at a loss.”). 
 137 See Beijing rules: China’s state-owned enterprises, ECONOMIST (May 1, 1997), 
http://www.economist.com/node/148434 [https://perma.cc/F2TT-6BER]. 
 138 Id. 
 139 CHOW, LEGAL SYSTEM OF CHINA, supra note 23, at 24. 
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In 2003, only two years after China’s accession to the WTO, the 
Party took a major step in increasing its control over SOEs when it 
established the State Owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission (“SASAC”).140  The SASAC is a central level 
government agency that serves as the controlling shareholder of all 
SOEs in China,141 allowing China to consolidate control over all 
SOEs in one entity.  More than merely a holding company, the 
SASAC also actively manages its SOEs.142  The SASAC is perhaps 
the most powerful holding company in the world, controlling more 
than half of the Chinese SOEs on the global Fortune 500.143  Also in 
2003, China established a second central level entity, Central Huijin 
Investment Ltd. (CHI), to increase its control over China’s banks.144  
The CHI serves as the controlling shareholder of China’s banks, the 
lifeblood of the massive financial sector.145  China’s top four largest 
commercial banks—the Bank of China, the Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China, the China Construction Bank, and the 
Agricultural Bank of China—are larger than any U.S., European, or 
Japanese bank.146  As in the case of SASAC, CHI is not only a holding 
company but is an active manager of these banks.147  Together, the 
SASAC and CHI allow the state to control China’s industrial and 
financial sectors, creating a firm grip over China’s economy.148  SOEs 
implement the Party’s initiatives in the industrial sector, and banks 
support SOEs by making loans to them under Party direction.149 
In 2006, China announced a set of indigenous innovation policies 
designed to propel the nation forward in its race to become more 
globally competitive.150  Although announced in 2006, these policies 
 
 140 Mark Wu, The “China, Inc.” Challenge to Global Trade Governance, 57 HARV. 
J. INT’L L. 261, 271 (2016). 
 141 Id. 
 142 Id. at 272. 
 143 Id. at 271. 
 144 Id. at 274. 
 145 Id. 
 146 Id. at 273. 
 147 Id. at 274. 
 148 Id. at 272, 274. 
 149 Id. 
 150 See China: Intellectual Property Infringement, Indigenous Innovation 
Policies, and Frameworks for Measuring the Effects on the U.S. Economy, Inv. No. 
332-514, USITC Pub. 4199 (amended) at 5-1 (Nov., 2010), 
https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4199.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GLV2-SBTY] [hereinafter United States International Trade 
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had antecedents in policies beginning in 1986 when the basic goals 
were first formulated.151  These indigenous innovation policies were 
a web of practices, policies, and measures designed to encourage the 
use of locally produced technology (i.e., IPR) and to wean China off 
the use of foreign-sourced technology.152  Among the most 
controversial of these policies were government-procurement 
policies that favored the purchase of products with indigenous 
innovation over products with foreign-sourced technology.153  The 
stated goal of these policies was to produce “national champion” 
companies, i.e., SOEs that could compete effectively with 
multinational companies in international business.154  U.S. 
companies have claimed that these policies discriminated against 
U.S. multinationals in China, and the United States has continuously 
pressured China to reform them.155 
Coinciding with the announcement of its indigenous innovation 
policies, China began an aggressive expansion of business 
conducted by SOEs abroad by entering into trade agreements with 
mostly developing countries including Chile (2006), Pakistan (2006 
and 2009), Singapore (2009), and Costa Rica (2010).156  China also 
entered into several multilateral trade agreements, including the 
Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement (2005) (China, Bangladesh, India, 
Laos, South Korea, and Sri Lanka)157 and the Framework Agreement 
on Economic Cooperation with South East Asian Nations (2010) 
 
Commission Report] (“In recent years, China has introduced a number of policies 
aimed at increasing the level of scientific and technological innovation originating 
within the country.”). 
 151 See id. at 5-2 (“[M]any observers note that promoting innovation and 
technological development has long been an important theme for the Chinese 
government.”). 
 152 Id. at 5-3. 
 153 Daniel C.K. Chow, China’s Indigenous Innovation Policies and the World Trade 
Organization, 34 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 81, 83 (2013) [hereinafter Chow, Indigenous 
Innovation Policies]. 
 154 United States International Trade Commission Report, supra note 150, 5-6. 
 155 Chow, Indigenous Innovation Policies, supra note 153, at 84-85. 
 156 China maintains a website with its foreign trade agreements.  See CHINA 
FTA NETWORK, http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/english/index.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/3ALX-YKXL] (last visited Apr. 10, 2020). 
 157 U.N. Econ. & Soc. Comm’n for Asia and the Pacific, Amendment to the 
First Agreement on Trade Negotiations among Developing Member Countries of 
the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (Bangkok 
Agreement), Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement (Nov. 2, 2005), 
https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/02_Amendment%20to%20Bangko
k%20Agreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/H784-U7CT]. 
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(China, Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao, Malaysia, Myanmar, 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, and other nations).158  
These agreements pave the way for SOEs to expand their operations 
in foreign countries under terms that do not contain restrictions 
related to workers’ rights, labor conditions, and the environment.159  
The lack of these constraints allow SOEs from China to operate with 
lower costs than multinational companies from the United States 
that are subject to myriad constraints on their behavior under U.S. 
treaties and federal law.160  In 2016, China established the Asia 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) to serve as a rival to the U.S.-
backed World Bank.161  A major purpose of the AIIB is to provide 
funding for major infrastructure projects in Asian countries that will 
be implemented by China’s SOEs.162  In other words, China will lend 
money through the AIIB to foreign countries who will then use the 
funds to pay China’s SOEs to implement infrastructure projects. 
In 2013, at the conclusion of the Third Plenum of the Communist 
Party, the Party reaffirmed its support of SOEs when it announced 
that it would “incessantly strengthen [the] vitality” of SOEs.163  The 
Party reiterated its support for SOEs for the near future—up to 2025 
and beyond—when in 2015, China announced a major new policy 
initiative, “Made in China 2025.”164  This initiative advances themes 
proposed by the indigenous innovation policies announced in 
 
 158 Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-Operation 
Between the Association of South East Asian nations and the People’s Republic of 
China (Nov. 4, 2002), https://wits.worldbank.org/GPTAD/PDF/
archive/ASEAN-China.pdf [https://perma.cc/2459-UCCL]. 
 159 Daniel C.K. Chow, How China Promotes Its State-Owned Enterprises at the 
Expense of Multinational Companies in China and Other Countries, 41 N.C. J. INT’L L. 
455, 486-87 (2016) [hereinafter Chow, How China Promotes its SOEs]. 
 160 Id. at 487. 
 161 Daniel C.K. Chow, Why China Established the Asia Infrastructure Investment 
Bank, 49 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1255, 1256, 1258-59 (2016). 
 162 Id. at 1293-94 (explaining that “China can promote SOEs by using the AIIB 
to make loans to developing countries to fund infrastructure projects that will be 
implemented by SOEs. In other words, China may use the AIIB to lend money to 
other countries to buy Chinese goods and services from SOEs.”). 
 163 Bob Davis & Brian Spegele, State Companies Emerge as Winners Following Top 
China Meeting: Enterprises Fended Off Calls to Curb Their Influence, WALL STREET J. 
(Nov. 13, 2013), https://www.wsj.com/articles/state-companies-emerge-as-
winners-following-top-china-meeting-1384352718 [https://perma.cc/RU5W-
SDFP]. 
 164 U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, MADE IN CHINA 2025: GLOBAL AMBITIONS BUILT 




2020] The Myth of China's Open Market Reforms 969 
2006.165  Under Made in China 2025, the goal is for China to move 
further up the value and technology chain and become a leader in 
global manufacturing.166  Among the ten industries singled out for 
development under Made in China 2025 are advanced information 
technology, aerospace and aviation equipment, advanced rail 
equipment, biomedicine and high-performance medical devices, 
and agricultural machinery.167  Made in China 2025 envisions a 
three-part strategy: localize innovation, replace foreign-sourced 
technology with locally created technology, and capture domestic 
and international market share in the ten strategic industries.168  In 
2016, China once again reiterated the leadership role of SOEs in a 
national meeting on building the role of the Party within SOEs.169  
President Xi emphasized the role of the SOE as an instrumentality 
of the Party and announced that Party leadership and increasing the 
role of the Party are “the root and soul” of SOEs.170 
These developments indicate that after China’s accession to the 
WTO in 2001, China has regularly adopted major policy initiatives 
that strengthened the Party’s grip over the economy and has 
announced plans for SOEs to become leaders in global business.  The 
Party has sought to further embed itself in SOEs to the point where 
the two now seem to be fused together. 
B. Party Control of the Economy through the State Sector 
The Party is able to exercise pervasive control over SOEs and, 
through SOEs, all vital sectors of China’s economy.  Within SOEs, 
organizational structures allow the Party to exercise control at the 
management level but also in the day-to-day affairs of the 
company.171  Within each SOE, there are two parallel management 
 
 165 Id. at App. 1.F (listing “Overlapping Plans”). 
 166 Id. at 9. 
 167 Id. at 6. 
 168 Id. at 13. 
 169 See Xi stresses CPC leadership of state-owned enterprises, CHINA DAILY (Oct. 12, 
2016), https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2016-10/12/content_27035822.htm 
[https://perma.cc/V52X-3LVE] (“Efforts should be made to strengthen and 
improve Party leadership, as well as to build the role of the Party in SOEs to make 
them the most trustworthy and reliable forces of the CPC and the state, said Xi.”). 
 170 Id. 
 171 See Chow, How China Promotes its SOEs, supra note 159, at 468 (describing 
the two parallel management structures of SOEs). 
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structures: one is the corporate management structure consisting of 
a chief executive officer, one or more vice chief executive officers, a 
chief accounting officer, and a board of directors.172  This type of 
management structure is similar to corporate organizations in the 
United States.  A second parallel structure is the Party organization: 
the Party structure consists of a secretary of the Party (the highest 
position), several deputy secretaries, and a secretary of the 
Discipline Inspection Commission (the word “Discipline” is a 
surrogate for the more threatening sounding “corruption”).173  Each 
person who holds a position in the corporate management structure 
simultaneously holds a position of equal rank within the Party 
structure, with the Party position as the more powerful.174  As the 
Party organization must meet regularly, Party members are able to 
carry out the directives of the Party at the enterprise management 
level and also at the level of day-to-day operations.175  This structure 
also exists at all levels of the government (central, provincial, and 
local).176  This is the key structure through which the Party controls 
the State.  The supervision of the SASAC, discussed above, helps to 
ensure that Party management of SOEs is consistent across 
industrial sectors.  The SASAC regularly rotates personnel between 
the SASAC and SOEs.177  This rotation deepens the cooperation 
between the SOEs and the state.178 
SOEs are more than just important economic actors in China.  
SOEs also serve as the mechanism by which the Party is able to 
exercise pervasive control over the economy.  Given this role, 
dismantling SOEs would mean that the Party would relinquish 
significant power.  Instead of dismantling SOEs, the Party promotes 
and protects them.179 
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C. Party Control and Personal Wealth 
A consequence of the Party’s control of the economy is that 
members of the Party have been able to acquire immense personal 
wealth despite modest official salaries.180  In 2012, the New York 
Times published an article detailing the personal and family wealth 
of Wen Jiabao, then China’s Premier,181 often portrayed in the media 
as a benevolent figure known as “Uncle Wen.”182  The article details 
a Wen family fortune worth $2.7 billion with holdings in 
telecommunications, real estate, and insurance.183  Wen’s 90-year old 
mother alone had $120 million in investments in an insurance 
company.184  The article notes that Wen’s family fortunes soared off 
the charts after his elevation to power as premier.185  In 2014, after 
an investigation of Zhou Yongkang, a former Minister of Public 
Security and senior Party member, China seized assets worth $14.5 
billion from Zhou’s family and associates.186  Some of this wealth is 
ostentatious.  The disgraced former senior Party member Bo Xilai’s 
holdings included a multi-million-dollar lakeside villa in Cannes, 
Southern France.187 
 
 180 Xi Jinping, for example, earns about $22,000 a year as the President of 
China.  Lily Kuo, Does Chinese president Xi Jinping really earn just $22,000 a year?, 
QUARTZ (Jan. 20, 2015), https://qz.com/329584/does-chinese-president-xi-jinping-
really-earn-just-22000-a-year/ [https://perma.cc/MUM5-XT8E] (discussing 
widespread perception that Party officials are corrupt). 
 181 David Barboza, Billions in Hidden Riches for Family of Chinese Leader, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 25, 2002), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/26/
business/global/family-of-wen-jiabao-holds-a-hidden-fortune-in-china.html 
[https://perma.cc/ZWB6-QT5N]. 
 182 See, e.g., Dhara Ranasinghe, Expose on Wen Jiabao’s Wealth—Storm in a 
Teacup?, CNBC (Nov. 11, 2012), https://www.cnbc.com/id/49719053 
[https://perma.cc/4PXA-XEJU] (describing a potential scandal where many of 
Wen’s relatives “became extraordinarily wealthy during the premier’s term in 
office”). 
 183 Barboza, supra note 181. 
 184 Id. 
 185 Id. 
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In 2013, with his ascension to power as President, Xi Jinping 
launched a major crackdown on corruption.188  As of 2018, the 
crackdown has punished an astonishing 1.5 million corrupt Party 
officials.189  Critics of Xi, however, argue that his anti-corruption 
campaign is motived not by altruistic goals but by a desire to root 
out his enemies and consolidate his power.190  In 2018, riding a wave 
of popularity due in part to his stance against corruption in the 
Party, Xi was able to remove term limits on his presidency, allowing 
him to serve for life.191  Critics further argue that corruption is built 
into the structure of China’s governing institutions and that Xi’s goal 
is not to wipe out corruption but to manage it for his own political 
purposes.192  According to these observers, Xi shows little interest in 
making the types of institutional reforms that would truly root out 
and eliminate corruption.193  It appears to be likely that Party 
members—at least those not out of favor with Xi—may be able to 
continue to amass and retain private fortunes.  For example, Wen 
never faced any consequences after the New York Times exposé about 
his family wealth.  Instead, the Party was infuriated by the Times 
article and punished the New York Times by blocking it from China’s 
websites,194 a ban that remains in effect to this day, more than six 
years later.  Another prominent example is Xi himself, whose family 
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has been able to accumulate over $1 billion in personal wealth,195 
despite Xi’s very modest government salary.196  Although the 
current anti-corruption campaign is noted for its intensity and 
duration, most people in China continue to hold a cynical view of 
Party members.197  SOEs are notoriously corrupt,198 and many 
believe that Party officials at all levels are able to acquire wealth 
through their positions and their control of SOES and the 
economy.199 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Trump Administration’s claim that the United States erred 
in supporting China’s entry into the WTO is based upon a flawed 
premise.  This premise is that China made an explicit or implicit 
commitment to dismantle its state-led economy in favor of 
eventually establishing an open market economy.  China never 
made such a commitment and China is not otherwise bound by any 
legal obligations found in the WTO to do so.  Perhaps China is 
“guilty” of allowing Clinton to trumpet the possibility of democratic 
reform as a result of its accession to the WTO without correcting 
him.  If that is the extent of China’s culpability, then China has done 
no more than take advantage of a wrong-headed opponent by 
allowing him to reach the conclusions he wanted for political 
reasons.  If an error was involved, it was on the part of the United 
States, which, due to wishful thinking, political expediency, or a 
combination of both, falsely convinced itself that China made a 
commitment to fully embrace open-market oriented reforms and 
eventually dismantle the state sector of the economy. 
Not only has China not retreated from a state-led economy, 
China has been unwavering in strengthening it beginning shortly 
after its accession to the WTO.  A series of major policy initiatives, 
declared with great fanfare and in plain sight starting shortly after 
China’s accession, indicates that the Party has no intention of 
abandoning China’s state-led economy but seeks to elevate it.  China 
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now has ambitious plans to lift its SOEs to the top level of 
international competition in the most advanced industries in the 
world by 2025.  China also plans to further elevate and entrench the 
role of the Party in SOEs.  To believe that China will abandon the 
state sector in light of these developments is pointless and naïve.  
Such a belief also ignores the forces of Chinese history and tradition. 
The Party is a devoted student of Chinese history, tradition, and 
culture and China is a country that is perhaps more bound by these 
forces than most.  President Xi has stated that the “values and 
spiritual world of the Chinese people have always been deeply 
rooted in the fertile soil of China’s traditional culture.”200  Xi also 
stated that “the Chinese Communist Party is the successor to and 
promoter of fine traditional Chinese culture.”201  In the context of 
Chinese culture, the Party sees its ascension to power in China in 
heroic terms and as a matter of destiny.202  The PRC Constitution 
states that after years of domination by foreign nations, China was 
reduced to a “semi-colonial country”203 and waged many “heroic 
struggles for national liberation and independence.”204  After 
“protracted and arduous struggles . . . along a zig zag course”205 the 
Communist Party led by Mao finally “overthrew the rule of 
imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism”206 and achieved 
“a great victory in the New-Democratic Revolution.”207  Through the 
Party the Chinese people finally became the “masters of the 
country.”208  The implication of the Constitution is that only the 
Party was able to emerge from the chaos of the twentieth century to 
save the Chinese people from foreign oppression and internal decay. 
Like the emperors of China that preceded it, the Party seized 
power through bloodshed and violent overthrow by vanquishing a 
ruling government that had succumbed to moral corruption.209  
Chinese history and philosophy teach that an emperor ruled 
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through the “Mandate of Heaven” (i.e. legitimate power) and 
continued in power until he lost it by descending into tyranny or 
moral decay.210  At that point, a new leader with a new Mandate of 
Heaven will appear to depose the sitting leader and assume the 
throne.211  Every emperor of China held the Mandate of Heaven until 
he was deposed.212  Just as throughout Chinese history the Mandate 
of Heaven is never voluntarily relinquished but is forfeited, the 
Party sees itself as holding onto the Mandate of Heaven until it is 
forfeited.213  The notion that the Party will voluntarily abandon its 
seat of power in favor of a democracy is naïve and against the tide 
of Chinese history, culture, and philosophy in which the Party holds 
a deep belief.  Adding to the forces of tradition are also the deepest 
tendencies of human nature.  Party members enjoy great power and 
personal wealth under the current system.214 
The United States now admits that its efforts to push, prod, or 
cajole China into adopting open market-oriented reforms within the 
WTO have been largely futile.  The Trump Administration seems to 
have concluded that seeking China’s reform through the use of the 
WTO, including its dispute settlement system, will be ineffective in 
achieving open market-oriented reforms in China.  Instead, the 
United States has adopted an approach of imposing unilateral trade 
sanctions on China outside of and in contravention of the WTO.215  
This approach aims to coerce China into adopting changes that 
China would not accept through WTO negotiations.216  China has 
responded with indignation and defiance by imposing retaliatory 
measures against the United States.217  Since President Trump first 
imposed new tariffs on steel and aluminum from China and other 
nations on March 23, 2018,218 the two protagonists have been locked 
in a dangerous and escalating tit-for-tat tariff war.219 
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On January 20, 2020, the United States and China entered into 
Phase One of the Economic and Trade Agreement between the 
United States and China220 designed to resolve the trade dispute 
between the two countries.  Under Phase One, China made 
numerous significant commitments in intellectual property 
protection221 and dispute resolution222 and also committed to 
purchase at least $200 billion in goods from the United States in the 
next two years.223  What is significant about the Phase One 
agreement is that it contains no obligations on the part of China to 
reform its state-led economy.224  China rebuffed talks on this subject 
during the Phase One negotiations.225  The United States hopes to 
obtain concessions on this issue, the most difficult and intractable of 
all in the two countries’ negotiations, for Phase Two of the 
agreement to be reached in the next round of negotiations.226 
Will these negotiations allow the United States to obtain a firm, 
specific commitment from China to dismantle its state-led economy, 
a goal that the United States could not achieve within the WTO?  
Based on the discussions in this Article, the United States cannot be 
optimistic.  The United States can expect that China will continue to 
rebuff talks on this subject.  Even if China agrees to talks, it will be 
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difficult to obtain firm commitments from China to dismantle its 
state-led economy and any commitments obtained from China are 
likely to be illusory.  The Agreement contains a provision that allows 
China to terminate it at any time by the submission of a notice of 
withdrawal.227  The United States should be aware that China’s 
strategy may be to agree to Phase Two just to avert a destructive 
trade war, then delay the implementation of commitments, if any 
are reached, to reform its state-led economy, and then to withdraw 
from the Agreement once the simmering effects of the trade war 
have passed and China is in a stronger position to resist further U.S. 
attempts at intimidation.  The negotiations of Phase Two and the 
conclusion and implementation of the agreement bear careful 
watching in the next several years to come. 
At this point, let us be clear that there is nothing legally or 
morally wrong with China’s choice of an economic or political 
system.  Despite the U.S. claims to the contrary there is no reason 
why a sovereign nation that adopts a state-led economy over an 
open market economy is in moral, legal, or historical error.228  Once 
the U.S. claim that China has a legal obligation to adopt an open 
market economy is debunked, China, like any other sovereign 
nation, has the right and full freedom to adopt any economic or 
political system that it sees fit regardless of criticism from the United 
States.229  Other nations have the freedom to trade with China as they 
wish or to enter into disputes over trade with China as they see fit.230  
But in these disputes no nation, including the United States, has the 
higher moral or legal ground.231 
Frustrated with the lack of progress in dealing with China within 
the WTO, the United States is now determined to work outside of 
the WTO and deal with China directly through the use of economic 
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might. 232  Despite the progress reached by concluding Phase One of 
the Economic Agreement to end the trade war,233 the ability of the 
United States to secure and enforce an obligation by China to 
implement open market reforms through this process is far from 
certain.  Moreover, regardless of the effectiveness of the U.S 
approach to China outside of the WTO, the United States must still 
address the issue of what to do about China’s future in the WTO. 
It should be clear that China’s status quo in the WTO is not 
acceptable.  The article has shown that the present approach of 
coaxing China to adopt open market reforms in the WTO is futile, 
traceable to a myth and a hopeful illusion.  It should also be clear 
that doing nothing is also not acceptable.  China has been able to 
exploit the benefits of its WTO membership to become dominant in 
world trade with a state-led economy that cannot be reined in by the 
rules of the WTO.  China will only become more dominant in the 
WTO and world trade if the United States does nothing. 
At this point, the United States is realistically faced with only 
two choices.  The United States can seek to have China renegotiate 
its terms of membership in the WTO and impose the type of effective 
constraints that will allow the WTO to discipline China’s state-led 
economy and control its WTO inconsistent practices.234  One 
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practical step to further this approach would be for an alliance of 
countries, consisting of the United States, the European Union, and 
Japan and others to bring a broad-based case in the WTO dispute 
settlement system against China challenging its state-led 
practices.235  The other choice is for China to exit the WTO.  This 
possibility seems unlikely without pressure, but it might be possible 
to bring pressure on China within the WTO through the U.S.-EU-
Japan alliance to confront China with the choice to either reform or 
exit.  Both of these approaches have the advantage of squarely 
raising the issue of what to do about China’s state-led economy 
before the WTO membership.  It is beyond the scope of this Article 
to develop these paths more fully, but that is not this Article’s aim.  
The present aim is to finally dispel the myth created by Clinton that 
China will dismantle its state-led economy and adopt an open 
market economy.  It is imperative to understand that China will 
remain a state-led economy so long as the Party is in power.  By 
accepting this sober realization, the United States can deal more 
effectively in the future with China in the WTO, in bilateral trade 
negotiations outside of the WTO, and beyond. 
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